NEW POLITICAL TOPOGRAPHIES. MINING COMPANIES AND INDIRECT DISCHARGE IN SOUTHERN KATANGA (DRC)

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NEW POLITICAL TOPOGRAPHIES. MINING COMPANIES AND INDIRECT DISCHARGE IN SOUTHERN KATANGA (DRC)

For analysing current reconfigurations of political order in Africa in a new way, this article suggests a focus on particular socio-economic spaces. It analyses how multinational companies govern security in the copper and cobalt mining region of Southern Katanga (DRC). The article argues that the extended role of companies in managing political order in Southern Katanga can be understood as a new form of indirect discharge by the host and the home states of multinational companies in such a way as to quasi-outsource local governance. It engenders political topographies different from those of corporate security governance in the XIXth-XXth centuries.

This article deals with the reconfiguration of political topographies in Africa[1]. Empirical statehood on the continent has only to a very limited extent been characterised by governments which exercise direct territorial control and other characteristics of the Weberian ideal-type *'Anstaltsstaat'*. Current arguments about a weakening or even a failure of the state are misleading as they are not always clear about this different starting point for contemporary reconfigurations of political order. To analyse current reconfigurations of political order in Africa in a new way, this article scales down the level of analysis from the central state to particular socio-economic spaces. Urban trading centres, rural zones of cash-crop production or enclaves of extraction provide meaningful units for comparative analysis of spatial reordering that is not centred *a priori* around the state. Such a perspective points to the flaws of statist approaches, whether they focus on the building or the failing of a territorial state. It also helps us to rethink what are old and what are

1. I thank Klaus Schlichte, Alexander Veit, Ulf Engel, Vincent Foucher, the participants of the panel Topographies of Rule at the European Conference of African Studies 2009 and in particular the four anonymous reviewers for *Politique africaine* for very helpful comments and suggestions. Final thanks to Nina Marshall, Barbara Kobler and Miriam Weihe for their research assistance and English corrections. An earlier draft of this article appeared as a Working Paper of the Graduate Centre Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Leipzig in 2009.

new phenomena in what is described as a 'new' post-Westphalian order and 'new' private governance in international relations.

I apply such a perspective to the case of company security governance in an African extraction enclave: the copper and cobalt mining region of Southern Katanga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Integrated in a transnational field of extraction, a plurality of actors make the mining areas a node of multiple governance interventions [2]. I trace how and where Western industrial mining companies have been involved in local ordering to secure extraction, and how this relates to governance by states. I argue firstly that local security governance by companies is not altogether new. I show how the colonial state in the now-DRC was built around pockets of "l'Afrique utile [3]" with the help of mining capital. However, the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion have shifted over time, as have the techniques and scope of companies' security governance. Contrary to arguments that interpret the increasing role of private actors in contemporary governance as a sign of the weakening power of central state authorities, borrowing from Max Weber and Beatrice Hibou, I argue, secondly, that the extended role of corporate entities in security governance in Southern Katanga can be understood as a new form of indirect governance, a policy of 'indirect discharge' by the host and the home states of multinational companies (MNCs) which amounts to quasi-outsourcing of local governance to companies. Weber originally used this concept to describe a technique of rule in empires and feudal states, which works through the delegation of coercive and extractive authority from central rulers to local power holders [4]. I argue, thirdly, that this leads to historically distinct topographies of political order.

I begin with a brief review of the literature on political topographies and on security governance in mining areas and outline my approach. I then turn to the copper and cobalt mining area in Southern Katanga, DRC. I trace different configurations for securing production and for discharging responsibility and control in the period from the arrival of Western companies in the 1890s to the establishment of colonial order by the 1920s, and the

2. The notion of nodes of governance is taken from criminologists L. Johnson and C. Shearing. See L. Johnston and C. Shearing, *Governing Security. Explorations in Policing and Justice*, New York, Routledge, 2003.

3. C. Boone, "'Empirical Statehood' and Reconfiguration of Political Order", *in* L. Villalón and P. Huxtable (eds.), *The African State at a Critical Juncture*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 129–141.

4. M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1980, p. 580–623; see also B. Hibou, "De la privatisation des économies à la privatisation des États. Une analyse de la formation continue de l'État", *in* B. Hibou (ed.), *La Privatisation des États*, Paris, Karthala, 1999, p. 12–67.

period of state reconstruction from 2003 to 2008[5]. I conclude by linking the case study findings back to the literature on political topographies and the state in Africa.

'New' political topographies, extraction and security governance

Among others, the historian Charles Maier traces the emergence and decline of modern territoriality. Territoriality refers to a historically-specific mode of organising social control in a "space with a border that allows effective control of public and political life[6]". It is linked to the emergence of sovereignty – the linking of political authority or 'decision space' to an 'identity space' within the bounded territory of states. Modern territoriality only became institutionalised as the dominant mode of political ordering in the era of the modern nation state (1870s-1960s). Although empirically sovereignty has conceivably varied between states during that period and after, as an idea upheld through mutual recognition[7] state sovereignty has and continues to powerfully organise international and African politics[8].

While nowhere fully realised, in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America the limited territorial reach of the central state has combined since its colonial imposition with a multiplicity of parallel, overlapping, and sometimes competing, spatial orders and sovereignties. The literature on state practices highlights the non-territorial strategies governments use to consolidate the central state's despotic power in such a context of multiple authorities and legal pluralism within a territory. The resulting "rhizomatic statehood[9]" is built on personalised, asymmetric networks, delegating the

5. As my field research took place from 2006 to 2008 I do not discuss the effects of the economic recession after the recent financial crisis on companies' security governance.
6. C. Maier, "Transformations of Territoriality, 1600-2000", *in* G. Budde, S. Conrad and O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006, p. 34.
7. J. T. Biersteker and C. Weber, *State Sovereignty as Social Construction*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
8. C. Clapham, *Africa in the International System*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; W. Reno, "How Sovereignty Matters: International Markets and the Political Economy of Local Politics in Weak States", *in* T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds.), *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa. Global-Local Networks of Power*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 197–215; P. Englebert, *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2009.
9. J.-F. Bayart, *L'État en Afrique. La politique du ventre*, Paris, Fayard, 1989.

rule of sub-national territories to intermediaries[10]. Infrastructural power[11] has only been selectively developed and *de facto* sovereignty is often shared through arrangements of indirect rule[12]. The detailed administrative control of bounded space, as in more governmental states in Europe, is replaced by a sporadic, preventive demonstration of despotic, coercive power for stabilising regimes[13]. Questions about a reconfiguration of territoriality on the continent need to be studied against this background.

Since the end of the 1970s an "explosion of spaces[14]" has been observed. This observation was mainly written about for the Western world, indicating a transformation of the Westphalian, state-based order. While the permeability of national borders and the importance of the local and the transnational political spheres can hardly be denied, these observations have received different interpretations. It has been argued that states retreated or failed. Current reconfigurations are, however, better understood by thinking of them as processes of state transformation that are related to broader reconfigurations of spatial order[15].

The literature on the de-/re-territorialisation of political rule and economic production also underlines these interlinkages between local and global transformations. Saskia Sassen demonstrates how this leads to historically-specific political assemblages of different regimes of territoriality[16]. In economic geography, scholars have emphasised the *archipélisation* of production: clusters and enclaves of production are spread across the globe, increasingly detached from the economically 'useless' spaces in between[17]. Political

10. K. Schlichte, *Der Staat in der Weltgesellschaft. Politische Herrschaft in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika*, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2005, p. 115.

11. M. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results", *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 25, 1984, p. 185–212.

12. See for example C. Boone, *Political Topographies of the African State. Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

13. J. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000; A. Mbembe "At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa", *in* R. Beisinger and C. Young (eds.), *Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective*, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2002, p. 53–80.

14. H. Lefebvre, *Les Contradictions de l'État moderne. La dialectique de l'État*, Paris, UGE, 1978, p. 290.

15. See for example S. Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds.), *Transformation of the State?*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; R. Joseph, "The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa", *in* R. Joseph (ed.), *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999, p. 57–82.

16. S. Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006.

17. See for example W. Hein, *Globalisierung und Differenzierung. Neue theoretische Ansätze zur Regionalentwicklung*, University of Leipzig Papers on Africa, n° 47, 2001.

geographer Neil Brenner argues that the related re-scaling of the political does not abolish nation states, but emphasises their regulatory role while increasingly reallocating rule to local and regional levels [18]. Work on the re-scaling of decision-making arenas points to the emergence of more localised governance.

Since the 1980s, the literature on politics and the state in Africa has increasingly described the rise of networked, non-territorial rule. Privatisation and the retreat of the state from the economy, for instance, were promoted by international donors and financial institutions but, in contrast to their underlying neoliberal assumptions, these policies did not 'free' African markets from political interference. Instead they deprived governments of control of economic revenue, the redistribution of which had been used to bolster their control over local power centres. The neopatrimonial state's networks of power and social control contracted and had to reorganise. The contracted personal networks of political elites – at the level of the central state as much as that of different localities – reorganised control over accumulation [19]. A new anthropology of politics in Africa describes multiple political authorities and non-state sovereignties and highlights their historical continuities [20]. '*De facto* sovereignty [21]' in many African spaces is not only pluralised, lying with different actors within the same territory, but has also been transnationalised. Besides the policies of colonial and external governments, multinational companies directly shape local governance. Development and security interventions expand liberal rationalities and technologies of governance into the postcolony [22]. The literature on the "respacing" of Africa [23] is central to the main argument of this article.

18. N. Brenner, "Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies", *Theory and Society*, vol. 28, 1999, p. 39–78.

19. See for example C. Boone, "Africa's New Territorial Politics: Regionalism and the Open Economy in Côte d'Ivoire", *African Studies Review*, vol. 50, n° 1, 2007, p. 59–81; C. Clapham, *Africa…*, *op. cit.*; B. Hibou, "De la privatisation…", art. cit.

20. T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat, "Sovereignty Revisited", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 35, 2006, p. 295–315; A. Gupta and J. Ferguson, *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997; J. Roitman, "New Sovereigns? Regulatory Authority in the Chad Basin", *in* T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds.), *Intervention…*, *op. cit.*, p. 240–263.

21. T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds.), *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in a Postcolonial World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005.

22. T. Murray Li, *The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2007; J. Bachmann and J. Hönke, "'Peace and Security' as Counterterrorism? Old and New Liberal Interventions and their Social Effects in Kenya", *African Affairs*, vol. 109, n° 434, 2010, p. 97–114.

23. U. Engel and P. Nugent (eds.), *Respacing Africa*, Leiden, Brill, 2010; see also U. Engel and G. R. Olson, *Authority, Sovereignty and Africa's Changing Regimes of Territorialisat*ion, Working Paper Series of the Graduate Centre Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy Leipzig, n° 7, 2010.

In it I investigate the reconfiguration of political order and the spatial nature of governance in industrial mining regions. Drawing on Catherine Boone and Charles Tilly, I assume a relationship between geographies of production and political topographies, and suggest that studying patterns and processes of spatial reordering in particular socio-economic spaces provides a new entry point into understanding hybrid forms of governance that crosscut the local, national and international sphere[24]. Mining areas are transnationalised business spaces in which local, transnational and international actors engender a hybrid regime of security governance. They are in fact "critical junctures of globalisation[25]" in which struggles over and changes in regimes of territorialisation can be observed.

The governance of security by companies in Africa has so far been studied as part of research on the privatisation of global security governance[26]. Some studies have looked beyond private military security companies (PMSCs) and examined the security practices of corporations not specialised in security, such as those of the extractive industries[27]. Others have looked at companies as security actors in plural policing in Africa[28], but do not look at the local policing practices of companies. Again others discuss enclave governance with regards to the oil industry, but at a general level[29] or with a focus on the production of governable spaces through the construction of different communities[30]. None of the existing research focuses on shifts in the spatial geography of security governance nor on how companies' security practices fundamentally change the topography of (state) rule across time.

24. C. Boone, *Political…*, *op. cit.*; C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD 990-1992*, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1992.
25. U. Engel and M. Middell, „Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes. Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung", *Comparativ*, vol. 15, n° 6, 2005, p. 5–38.
26. D. Avant, *The Market for Force*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; R. Abrahamsen and M. C. Williams, "Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics", *International Political Sociology*, vol. 3, n° 1, 2009, p. 1–17.
27. A. Zalik, "The Niger Delta: 'Petro Violence' and 'Partnership Development'", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 101, 2004, p. 401–424; J. G. Frynas, "Corporate and State Response to Anti-oil Protests in the Niger Delta", *African Affairs*, vol. 100, n° 398, 2001, p. 27–54.
28. B. Baker, *Multi-Choice Policing in Africa*, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2008; A.-M. Singh, *Policing and Crime Control in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, Burlington, Ashgate, 2008.
29. J. Ferguson, "Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 107, n° 3, 2005, p. 377–382; R. Soares De Oliveira, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*, London/New York, Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 103–119.
30. M. Watts, "Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria", *Geopolitics*, vol. 9, n° 1, 2004, p. 50–80.

This article tries to fill this gap[31]. It starts with a history of this transnationalised mode of security governance: how, by whom and where has security been governed in the late XIXth and early XXth centuries? How has this changed today? Instead of providing a rigorous definition of 'security' that seeks to nail down this fuzzy concept, security practices are understood in this article as what company personnel understand to be such[32]. Thus, development interventions as well as armed protection or law enforcement may all be part of security governance.

Governing pockets of 'l'Afrique utile' in Katanga, 1890 to the 1920s

From a spatial perspective, the DRC institutionalised an "archipelago state[33]". In the economic realm, it inherited an outward-oriented archipelago economy. Colonial governments and companies invested in islands of 'useful' cash crop production and mining enclaves that they connected to the global economy, with many 'useless' spaces lying in between. As opposed to the regimes of territoriality suggested by Charles Maier, direct private company governance played an important role in Southern Katanga for much longer than just the period prior to the mid-XIXth century[34]. The copperbelt of Katanga was integrated into a globalising economy from the beginning of industrial mining in the XIXth century, and foreign capital has shaped local politics and security governance ever since.

Large-scale industrial mining was a driver for the introduction of more direct modes of controlling African territory. Emerging enclaves of mining not only required the mobilisation of international capital to build up industrial infrastructure, they also required the administration of the rural hinterland to provide access to labour and cheap food supplies[35]. Southern

31. The article builds upon J. Hönke, *Liberal Discourse and Hybrid Practise in Transnational Security Governance: Companies in Congo and South Africa in the 19th and 21st Centuries*, PhD dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010. See for a related, earlier argument J. Hönke, "Extractive Orders: Transnational Mining Companies in the Nineteenth and Twenty-first Centuries in the Central African Copperbelt", *in* R. Southall and H. Melber (eds.), *A New Scramble for Africa?*, Durban, KwaZulu Natal Press, 2009, p. 274–298.
32. M. Valverde, "Analyzing the Governance of Security: Jurisdiction and Scale", *Behemoth. A Journal on Civilisation*, vol. 1, 2008, p. 3–15.
33. D. Tull, *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo)*, Hamburg, Institute of African Affairs, 2005, p. 43.
34. C. Maier, "Transformations…", art. cit.
35. B. Jewsiewicki, "Rural Society and the Belgian Colonial Economy", *in* D. Birmingham and P. M. Martin (eds.), *History of Central Africa. Vol. 2*, New York, Longman, 1983, p. 98.

Katanga was violently brought under control by a public-private partnership: the *Compagnie du Katanga* (CdK) which received exclusive buying and selling rights from the Belgian king Leopold II, as well as unhindered control over Katanga to open up its copper and cobalt reserves[36]. After the local ruler was overthrown and local chiefs were co-opted, the area was put under joint business-state control[37]. The inextricably intertwined nature of Leopold's colonial aspirations and company interests is nicely captured by the label '*État holding*[38]'. When the international critique of Leopold's violent regime in the Congo Independent State peaked, the Belgian state took over authority, forming the colony of the Belgian Congo.

In this territory, the Union minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), created in 1906 and largely owned by Belgian financial capital, developed into a 'state within a state'[39]. In a determinate space, the UMHK and the colonial state together built pockets of territorial rule around the sites of industrial mining, including a network of urban commercial centres, ports and railways[40]. The UMHK set up labour camps that it fully governed. Conditions in these were extremely bad, as the company herded African labour that was needed for constructing the railway and the early mine infrastructure into them, replacing losses with others recruited by force[41]. The testimony of a 'boss boy' summarises the climate in which people worked: "The work here is hard. Moreover, the Europeans strike us with their hand and feet. […] The hospital treats diseases with forced labour[42]". What we see here is a coercive regime of territorial governance.

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36. Following an appeal by Leopold II, the Belgian private sector became the major partner in colonising Katanga. The CdK was created in 1891 following a request by the king to protect Katanga from being conquered by the British South Africa Company.

37. R. Slade, *King Leopold's Congo*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 134–135.

38. J.-L. Vellut, "Les bassins miniers de l'ancien Congo belge. Essai d'histoire économique et sociale (1900-1960)", *Les cahiers du Cedaf*, vol. 7, 1981, p. 1–70.

39. J. Depelchin, *From the Congo Free State to Zaire (1885-1974)*, Dakar, Codesria, 1992. The UMHK was jointly owned by the Comité spécial du Katanga (CSK), the Société générale de Belgique, the British Tanganyika Concession Limited and other minor shareholders. See I. Ilunkamba, "Propriété publique et conventions de gestion dans l'industrie du cuivre du Zaire", *Les Cahiers du Cedaf*, vol. 4/5, 1984, p. 1–185. From 1900 the CSK, another public-private entity, took over the administration of Southern Katanga and also the entire Katanga province. The CSK received extended administrative powers, as compared to the CdK, but was no longer directly involved in mineral explorations.

40. J.-L. Vellut, "Mining in the Belgian Congo", *in* D. Birmingham and P. M. Martin (eds.), *History of Central Africa…*, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

41. B. Fetter, *The Creation of Elizabethville, 1910-1940*, Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, 1976, p. 35.

42. S. Claessens, "Inspection de l'industrie n° 152. État sanitaire de Likasi", Kambove, 14 October 1918, J.-L. Vellut collection, card n° 1418, cited *in* J. Higginson, *A Working Class in the Making: Belgian Colonial Labor Policy, Private Enterprise, and the African Mineworker, 1907-1951*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, p. 36–37.

By the 1920s, the company began enlarging the compounds in order to invest simultaneously in labour reproduction and control. This introduced a new mode of power: sovereign coercion was complemented with disciplinary power, thereby increasing the depth of governance interventions[43]. In the spirit of such new technologies of power, described by Foucault for Europe[44], colonial state and company governmental interventions intensified, aiming at the production of permanent wage labour[45]. The UMHK "sought to reach further under the workers' caps while tying their hands more fastly to new pacesetting machinery[46]", by combining control with paternal welfare provision in the *cités minières*: settlements exclusively for workers and their families. The company sought to change the habits and beliefs of people by introducing modern time management, Catholic obedience and schools – institutions that were at the heart of creating a modern, capitalist work ethos.

This also changed who governed. In the new workers' settlements, two authorities maintained a "totalitarian subculture[47]" in the mines and in the labour settlements in their direct vicinity: "the compound head, responsible for discipline maintenance, and the [Catholic] teacher-preacher responsible for morals and learning[48]". The colonial Belgian state, through the CSK, provided the security apparatus to enforce the new order and acted as a tax collector and as a punishing agent of last resort. What began to emerge by the 1920s, was a form of semi-private disciplinary governance in a rather coercive and particularly exclusive – colonial – form[49]. This brief analysis of company security governance in Katanga shows that, firstly, mining capital worked very closely with the state. Public-private co-governance is thus nothing new. The relationship here, however, is one of direct delegation of authority, initially by an external home state and then by the Belgian colonial government to the UMHK. Leopold II and later on the Belgian government, also held shares in the UMHK, alongside private investors such as the Société

43. J.-P. Peemans, *Le Congo-Zaïre au gré du XXe siècle. État, économie, société, 1880-1990*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1997, p. 37.
44. M. Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société. Cours au Collège de France (1975-1976)*, Paris, Gallimard, 1976.
45. J. Higginson, "Disputing the Machines: Scientific Management and the Transformation of the Work Routine at the Union minière du Haut-Katanga, 1918-1930", *African Economic History*, vol. 17, 1988, p. 1–21.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
47. B. Fetter, *L'Union minière du Haut-Katanga, 1920-1940. La naissance d'une sous-culture totalitaire*, Bruxelles, Centre d'études et de documentation africaines, 1973.
48. J.-L. Vellut, "Mining…", art. cit., p. 156.
49. Compare similar findings by S. I. Legg, *Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007, and T. Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt*, Los Angeles, California University Press, 1991.

générale and others. Secondly, we find a territorial mode of governing business spaces which does not, however, translate into the effective administration of colonial state territory. There is an extended bubble of company rule governing the production site, as well as the adjacent settlements of workers and their families, which is backed-up by the coercive capacities of the colonial state. The labour settlements remained, however, geographically separated from the African quarters of the growing mining towns that were not controlled by the company, and its management sought to "prevent bad influence" on the behaviour of workers by keeping them segregated from ordinary African townships[50]. The idea was to isolate the bubble of social order made by industrial production and a particular regulatory regime of discipline and control from a social environment represented by Europeans as 'hostile' and 'disorderly'.

Corporate risk management, protection belts, and indirect discharge in Katanga, 2005-2008

What Maier calls the beginning of a post-territorial regime, and Lefebvre refers to as an 'explosion of spaces', can also be found in the DRC from the late 1970s onwards. Yet here it took place under extremely different pre-conditions and with different dynamics than in the consolidated core of capitalist states. After the early authoritarian regime of Mobutu, its decline since the mid-1970s[51], and the collapse of the Congolese state and formal mining industry during the Congolese wars from 1996 to 2003[52], we currently observe attempts at (re)building a Congolese state and a formal mining economy. In the following I examine the topographies of governance in the context of the re-emerging industrial mining economy in Southern Katanga from 2005 to 2008, focusing on large, listed companies operating on the formal

50. D. Dibwe dia Mwembu and G. Kalaba Mutabusha, "Lubumbashi. Des lieux et des personnes", *in* D. de Lame and D. Dibwe dia Mwembu (eds.), *Tout passe. Instantanés populaires et traces du passé à Lubumbashi*, Tervuren, Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale, 2005, p. 62.
51. C. Young and T. Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
52. M. W. Nest, "Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", *African Affairs*, vol. 100, n° 400, 2001, p. 469–490; B. Rubbers, "L'effondrement de la Générale des carrières et des mines. Chronique d'un processus de privatisation informelle", *Cahiers d'études africaines*, vol. 46, n° 181, 2006, p. 115–133.

international market[53]. Foreign investment began pouring into Katanga's mining economy from 2005, when stability increased and preparations for presidential elections in 2006 were underway. Even though the situation remained unstable and insecure, by then companies assessed that the external sovereignty of the DRC was sufficiently re-established with enough legal security provided for them to risk (re-)investing in Katanga.

Adapting to the new domestic situation and to the international pressure to build an open, formal economy[54], the government of Joseph Kabila developed a preference for foreign industrial investments relative to artisanal mining. This has been interpreted as an attempt to better control and (re) centralise the collection of mining revenues by government[55]. Larger industrial companies thus increase state income and are easier to control and tax. From the point of view of the government, foreign firms strengthen its position, since they are seen as effectively reviving copper and cobalt extraction without strengthening potential competing power centres[56].

With companies taking on a number of governance functions at the local level, I argue that the government's policies can be understood as a new politics of indirect discharge. The recent literature on the politics of privatisation has reintroduced the governance technique of discharge. In reaction to the privatisation policies implemented since the 1980s, discharge has re-emerged as a means of consolidating the power of the central state through indirect governance, both through delegating state functions to non-state actors and indirectly ensuring control over the private sector[57].

The key point of this article is that discharge can work in very indirect ways and is not only used by companies' host states. Instead of direct

53. This section builds on field research in Southern Katanga in 2007 and 2008. Interviews were conducted with: academics, international NGOs, consultants and lawyers working on the DRC, on mining, and on Katanga; project managers of NGOs; representatives of international organisations, donor organisations, government, and in particular the security sector (the local and provincial branches of the Police nationale congolaise – PNC –, and the Police des mines et hydrocarbures – PMH); and operation, security and community managers of the largest foreign-listed industrial mining companies in Southern Katanga, namely Tenke Fungurume Mining/ Freeport MacMoRan, Anvil Mining, Ruashi Mining/Metorex Group, First Quantum Minerals, and KOL/DCP.

54. See for example Banque mondiale, *République démocratique du Congo. La bonne gouvernance dans le secteur minier comme facteur de croissance*, rapport n° 43402-ZR, mai 2008.

55. S. Van Hoyweghen, T. Trefon and S. Smis, "State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 29, n° 93-94, 2002, p. 381.

56. See also P. Englebert, "Why Congo Persists: Sovereignty, Globalization and the Violent Reproduction of a Weak State", *QEH Working Paper Series n° 95*, Oxford Department of International Development, 2003, p. 28–29.

57. B. Hibou, "De la privatisation…", art. cit.; see also A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001.

delegation, indirect mechanisms make companies take up governance functions: the discourse of corporate responsibility and private authority, and the (sometimes strategic) absence of the state from providing collective goods. It is a mechanism that is thus not only used by African governments. It is also employed by the international community and MNCs' home states, who increasingly attribute authority to companies to engage in the governance of business spaces in 'weak and failed states'.

An omnipresent but absent state

Concerning the role of the state in Katanga, state agents close to the current Kabila government control the provincial government and parts of the mining administration in order to exercise control over revenues, but are absent from the provision of social services and other collective goods. The state however exerts significant control as mining licenses can only be awarded by central government. The ways in which mining licences are awarded demonstrate the important role of powerful personal networks in government. In my own interviews, as well as in other studies, the involvement of senior politicians close to Joseph Kabila in mining contracts, but also in many 'illegal' mining and smuggling activities, is confirmed for the period after 2005[58]. One of the most notorious "political umbrellas[59]" is Katumba Mwanke, co-founder of the ruling party (the People's Party for Reconstruction and Development) and close advisor to the presidency. During the war, he brokered deals over key assets of state-owned mining companies Gécamines and Société minière de Bakwanga (Miba)[60]. While there are rumours about how companies acquired their contracts in general, in the specific case of Anvil Mining close relations behind the scenes with key political figures in Kinshasa are proven. Mwanke's presence on the board of Anvil Mining for several years shows the close link between new investors and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire war economy at that time[61]. The United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts

58. Global Witness, *Digging in Corruption. Fraud, Abuse and Exploitation in Katanga's Copper and Cobalt Mines*, Washington, 2006, p. 42–44; Netherlands institute for Southern Africa and International Peace Information Service, *The State versus the People. Governance, Mining and the Transitional Regime in the DRC*, Amsterdam, NIZA, 2006, p. 40–43.
59. Global Witness, *Digging…*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
60. Lutundula Commission Report, *Rapport des travaux. 1e partie*, Commission spéciale chargée de l'examen de la validité des conventions à caractère économique et financier conclues pendant les guerres de 1996-97 et de 1998, Kinshasa, 2005.
61. Broadcast of "The Kilwa Incident", Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 6 June 2005, including an interview with Bill Turner, CEO of Anvil Mining.

named Mwanke a key player in the plunder of the DRC's resources, so Joseph Kabila removed him from the government commission during the peace negotiations [62]. However, he has subsequently held several positions in the two Kabila governments and was involved in the joint venture deals that sold the remaining Gécamines assets to private companies [63].

The Congolese state has been (re)produced since the official end of the war – at least as an idea – by international state-building efforts, by governing domestic elites and, last but not least, by large foreign investors concluding contracts over mining, oil and infrastructure investments [64]. Yet it is a small network of high-level politicians around Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa that has remained in control of access to the mineral resources of Southern Katanga from a distance, and who pursue private commercial interests. Access to these personal networks has remained an important precondition for doing business in Katanga today [65].

In the mining areas of Southern Katanga, state agents are omnipresent, but largely pursue private interests: members of the PNC, the PMH, the security agencies (Agence nationale de renseignement and Direction générale des migrations), as well as of the Congolese army and the Presidential guard, all frequent mining sites, transport routes and border posts. The Kabila government also intervenes against critics of mining companies: the intimidation of local human rights groups working on artisanal mining as well as on multinational mining companies in Katanga has increased [66]. The state is, in contrast, largely absent or dysfunctional when it comes to solving conflicts and providing collective security and social services [67]. It relies on the companies, amongst others, to fulfil state functions – at least those usually associated with the state in liberal state theories – and to finance state institutions.

62. United Nations, *Report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, New York, 2002.
63. Barry Sergeant, "Mining D-Day in the Congo", *Mineweb*, 3 April 2007, available at <mineweb.net>.
64. P. Englebert, "Why…", art. cit.
65. Interviews with representatives of Anvil Mining, FQML, Ruashi Mining (Metorex), and observers of the political economy of extraction in Katanga, November 2007 and October-November 2008, Lubumbashi, Kinshasa, Ndola and Johannesburg.
66. The president of the local NGO Ashado was arrested in July 2009. See also interviews with local NGOs, October and November 2008, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi; J.-P. Nkutu, "Congo-Kinshasa – Affaire Golden Misabiko. Des activistes des droits humains dénoncent la politisation", *Le Phare*, 10 August 2009. During my fieldwork in 2008, for instance, the passports of a Norwegian TV team and a South African journalist were taken away and I got stuck for days as a research permit was refused for visiting mining sites.
67. See T. Trefon, *Ordre et désordre à Kinshasa. Réponses populaires à la faillite de l'État*, Tervuren/Paris, Institut africain/L'Harmattan, 2004; T. Trefon, *Parcours administratifs dans un État en faillite. Récits populaires de Lubumbashi (RDC)*, Paris/Brussels, L'Harmattan/Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale, 2007.

Bubbles of company governance I: Managing conflict over resources

Whilst in this sense the state is omnipresent in the background, in terms of performing other state functions, it is absent from the provision of collective goods. Mining companies in Southern Katanga hence provide their own security, drawing on the services of private security agents. A small in-house security department and a contracted private security provider are, however, also complemented with – equally contracted – state police. In such extended private company governance, the state thus still plays an important role. Yet it is a somewhat different one than in the past.

How companies take up governance functions in Southern Katanga can be illustrated, firstly, by showing how the new investors initially occupied the land which they had acquired exclusive mining rights for and how they have been defending it against competing interests since [68]. When, by 2005, large industrial mining companies arrived in Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi to occupy these mining concessions, or started actually producing, conflicts over access to the minerals erupted at the local level between small-scale, 'illegal' miners and their protectors on the one hand, and newly established 'legal' industrial mining companies with government contracts on the other. The new investors organised the occupation and defence of the concessions, where necessary against local communities and artisanal miners, while the government provided the legal status and police in return for payment. In contrast to company governance in the XIXth and early XXth centuries, no authority for governing local security has been delegated to them by the state. However, the intentional *laisser-faire* policy of Kinshasa has put firms in a position to manage security in and around their concessions.

A serious conflict developed between industrial and artisanal miners in Southern Katanga from 2005 onwards. Interviewees spoke of a "*guerre civile sociale*" during 2005-7 that rapidly developed into a regional problem, in particular in the mining town of Kolwezi in the north-east of the regional capital Lubumbashi. Riots escalated and the police called in by the companies, intervened violently [69]. The conflict in particular concerned the old open pit mines of Gécamines. Since the mid-1990s, deindustrialisation and the rise of a survivalist economy of artisanal extraction had gone hand in hand. Several tens of thousands of people have lived from artisanal mining in Katanga since

68. The following is based on interviews in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi in 2008 as well as on G. Mthembu-Salter, *Natural Resource Governance, Boom and Bust: The Case of Kolwezi in the DRC*, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009.
69. "Police clash with DR Congo Miners", *BBC News*, 7 March 2008.

then. In Kolwezi, it is 80 to 90 per cent of the population, including nearly anybody working in the state administration and the security services[70]. Neither the population affected by the new investments, nor the artisanal miners working on most Gécamines mines, had been consulted, nor had their interests been taken into account in agreements between the government, Gécamines and private companies[71].

How have the industrial mining companies dealt with these challenges? Companies used private security services, contracted consultants, and paid state police and the military to enforce their property rights. Ruashi Mining and Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM/Freeport), for instance, offered compensation to artisanal miners and transport to other mining sites. This incentive strategy proved short-sighted, as it contributed to the spill-over of the 'artisanal problem' to other mining sites. Some companies offered alternative employment, usually in two forms: companies either contracted NGOs to put artisanal miners in small business training programs and apprenticeships, or promised to recruit people for low-skilled jobs on the mines. In several cases these miners complained that such promises have not been kept. More generally, the employment alternatives are extremely limited in their reach, as tens of thousands of people lost their jobs.

Smaller and less visible firms immediately opted for calling in the state security forces – and paying for them - to suppress protest by artisanal miners or to 'clear' their concession at certain points, even though in many cases they had tacitly allowed them to work on their concession in return for extorting illegal taxes[72]. All the major international investors turned to coercive enforcement at some point. TFM/Freeport, for instance, developed with the mining police a system of fixed and moving patrols to get the concession under control. The company bought the services of up to 150 mining police agents to combat artisanal mining. Mine police and private security forces patrolled the area constantly. TFM/Freeport simultaneously began to strictly control the ore entering and leaving the concession, so that artisanal miners lost their supply chain. There were violent clashes between the police and members of the army, who attacked police roadblocks to protect their business

70. Interview with NGO Pact Congo and with the police and Gécamines representatives in Kolwezi, November 2008.
71. Interviews with the NGOs Ashado, ACIDH, SARW and other observers, 2007 and 2008, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi.
72. Violence has been reportedly used against artisanal miners by the trading company Chemaf at Ruashi. Similar incidents are reported from illegal artisanal sites on concessions of George Forrest company (interview with local human rights group, October 2008, Lubumbashi).

interests in the artisanal mining sector[73]. During these clashes, several artisanal miners who had sided with factions of the Congolese army were reported to have been killed[74]. All in all, most companies made use of the police's rapid reaction forces[75] and turned their operations into little fortresses to protect their concessions.

From the perspective of liberal economic theories and economic institutionalism, one may ask if protecting property rights is not what private business actors and states do everywhere, and if this is not actually at the heart of the police's mandate in the modern state[76]. Even from this view, however, it is still remarkable that this task is increasingly outsourced to private actors, in Africa and elsewhere[77]. Direct and indirect forms of discharging state functions to commercial actors abound beyond the DRC. In contexts such as in the DRC two problematic points need to be stressed in particular: first, how property rights have been enforced; and second, the lack of legitimacy of contract awarding practices in the first place.

Concerning the first point on how security is governed, the descriptions above have illustrated that human rights abuses, violence and death go along with clearing concessions. While companies such as Freeport McMoRan and Anvil Mining show that they are now aware of these problems and of the potential complicity in such behaviour by commercial or state security agents, it remains difficult for companies to comply with principles requesting them to abstain from such practices[78]. There is an unavoidably close entanglement of firms with state security agents in extraction enclaves that are at the basis of reproducing the political regime. Part of it is that PMSCs are not allowed to carry arms in the DRC[79]. Therefore, the mining industry depends on state

73. Interview with Commandant of the PMH, November 2008, Kolwezi; interview with social development and security managers, mining company, Lubumbashi and Fungurume, November 2008; see also R. Custers and S. Nordbrand, *Risky Business. The Lundin Group's Involvement in the Tenke Fungurume Mining Project in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Antwerp/Stockholm, International Peace Information Service/SwedWatch, 2008, p. 36–37.

74. "Accrochages entre éléments des FARDC et police des mines à Fungurume", *Radio Okapi*, 27 December 2005.

75. Interviews with company general and security managers as well as with members of the mining police (PMH) and the national, territorial police (PNC) in Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and at Fungurume, 2008.

76. I owe this question to one of my anonymous reviewers.

77. S. Gumedze, *Private Security in Africa: Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation*, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2007; E. Krahmann, *States, Citizens and the Privatisation of Security*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

78. T. A. Börzel and J. Hönke, "From Compliance to Practice: Mining Companies and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in the DRC", SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Research Centre SFB 700, Berlin, forthcoming.

79. M. de Goede, "Private and Public Security in post-War Democratic Republic of Congo", *in* S. Gumedze (ed.), *Private Security…*, *op. cit.*, p. 35-68.

security forces for robust operations. Government in turn makes companies pay state security forces; companies pay premiums per person[80]. Public security forces thus sell protection to private clients similarly to PMSCs. In 2003, a formal partnership agreement between the Congolese police and the private security industry was reached that formalized joint (armed) operations between public and private security providers. The agreement made it easier for companies to include payments to the police in their formal budgets[81]. Companies thus contribute to a commercialisation of state institutions and support patrimonial networks within the state administration.

Concerning the second point, there are serious problems with the legitimacy of the contracts between the MNCs and the government. These problems concern the legitimacy of the process leading to and the content of these contracts. Following the privatisation policy enacted by Kabila, with the support of the World Bank, since 2002, transnational companies struck deals with power brokers within the Kabila government that provided them with favourable conditions. By 2006, Gécamines was bound by 160 joint venture contracts with private companies. Participation and even consultation with local people about these contracts did not take place[82]. The recent review of mining contracts by the government which NGOs and critics had demanded is so ridden by lack of transparency and with political interference that it has hardly improved the situation[83]. A redistribution to the province and local communities, of the resource wealth extracted by companies, does not take place. Taxes from mining go to Kinshasa but are not distributed back to the provinces. It also remains unclear whether and how much taxes companies actually pay[84]. Selectively enforcing property rights for industrial mining companies has aggravated local social tensions and asymmetries.

80. Since 2006, companies have been officially paying about 200 US$ per person per month. 50% went to Kinshasa, and 50% to the police, of which again only a small amount eventually reached the individual policemen attached to a mine (arrêté interministériel, 13 June 2006; interview with company security managers, November 2008, Lubumbashi). The money goes into the private pockets of police officers rather than into a general budget for the institution.
81. M. de Goede, "Private…", art. cit.
82. Interviews with local NGOs Ashado, ACIDH in Lubumbashi, October 2007 and November/December 2008, and South Africa Research Watch (SARW), October 2008, Johannesburg.
83. *"A Fair Share for Congo!", DRC Mining Contract Review: Overview and State of Play. Update 4*, April 2008, available at <fataltransactions.org>.
84. Interviews with expert on decentralisation, UN Development Programme, October 2008, Lubumbashi; African Institute of Corporate Citizenship, *Mining Royalties Study*, unpublished draft, 2008. The decentralisation of tax revenues prescribed by the new Constitution would channel money back to mining communities and the provincial government, but has not been implemented (yet).

Bubbles of company governance II: Selective management of social (dis)order in the 'community belt'

Government also indirectly discharges responsibility for social order in the communities living in or adjacent to business spaces, to mining companies. In recent years, companies have extended the scope of their social programs and security management beyond the fortress of the mine into adjacent areas. MNCs thus provide for operational security by developmental and more traditional policing practices beyond their narrow private production sites, yet in significantly different ways than in the early XXth century. At the local level, the state indirectly discharges the management of local grievances and conflict to companies. Companies are the direct target of people's grievances and expectations in Southern Katanga. In addition to the frequent violent confrontations with artisanal miners, there are other examples. In Kolwezi, for instance, inhabitants of the former mining town UZK held hostage a security manager from one of the new companies on whose concession the former labour quarters were located, in order to put pressure on the company and the mayor to repair the settlement's water supply [85]. In addition, large internationally-listed firms are likely to be criticised for human rights abuses in remote places [86]. In this context, a local company representative put it this way: "We cannot point to the government. We cannot wait for government to build up" [87].

External governments also indirectly discharge governance functions to companies. External governments and international organisations increasingly attribute authority to companies to govern in "zones of weak governance [88]", such as in the DRC. Since the 1990s, and in particular since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, such zones, in particular in Africa, feature prominently in the Western (in)security discourse [89]. To address such unconventional risks that lie beyond, or result from the very weakness of the state, home state

85. Interview with company security manager, November 2008, Kolwezi.

86. In Katanga, Western NGOs such as Raid, Global Witness, Niza, and Ipis cooperate with local NGOs such as Ashado and ACIDH, and target the more visible companies with public campaigns in their home countries. On Kilwa incident, see Global Witness, Raid and ACIDH, *Kilwa Trial: A Denial of Justice. A Chronology: October 2004–July 2007*, Washington, 2007; Global Witness, "Digging…", art. cit.

87. Interview with social development and security managers, mining companies, November 2008, Lubumbashi.

88. Oganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones*, Paris, OECD, 2006.

89. J. Bachmann and J. Hönke, "'Peace…", art. cit.; P. J. Burgess (ed.), *Handbook of New Security Studies*, London, Routledge, 2010.

governments and international organisations appeal to companies to contribute to governing such disorderly contexts. This can be seen, for instance, in the Voluntary Principles asking companies to teach host states about human rights[90], or in efforts to make companies part of conflict prevention[91]. Where the resulting commitment of companies to transnational governance initiatives is not only on paper, this responsibilisation of companies has led to new forms of community engagement.

In terms of topography, corporate governance interventions beyond the narrow mining sites concentrate on a permeable belt of communities around operations. The community relations manager of a larger firm describes how in the DRC companies had to take on more and more social functions[92]. James Ferguson argues that mining companies have now become more "oil-like[93]", as production depends even less on local conditions and can now be cut off more easily from the social environment. Community conflicts around the oil platforms and pipelines in the swamps of the Niger Delta show that even off-shore industries cannot isolate themselves from the social and political environment in which they intervene.

To address such social and political risks, private governance is being extended beyond the fortress of the mining site. Such broader governmental interventions serve a different rationale than in the past, the scope and mode of governing in these pockets of intensified private governance is different. In contrast to the comprehensive system of coercive discipline and welfare in the company compound system in the early XXth century, companies no longer invest in the reproduction and formation of the labour force. This is reflected in the run-down state of the old workers' settlements[94] and the fact that the new investors have not shown any interest in rehabilitating them. The focus of current company security governance has become to pre-emptively govern security risks such as potential instability, physical threats

90. See <voluntaryprinciples.org>, in particular part two on company-host state interactions. The VPs are a non-binding transnational voluntary standard for company security governance. They have been initiated by the US and UK governments; current participants are six governments, some of the leading oil and mining companies, and a number of international NGOs. See also T. A. Börzel and J. Hönke, "From Compliance…", art. cit.

91. A. Wenger and D. Möckli, *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003.

92. Interview with community and conflict manager of a mining company, October 2007, Johannesburg.

93. J. Ferguson, "Governing Extraction. New Spatialisations of Order and Disorder in Neoliberal Africa", *in* J. Ferguson, *Global Shadows. Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 24.

94. D. Dibwe dia Mwembu, *Bana Shaba abandonnés par leur père. Structures de l'autorité et histoire sociale de la famille ouvrière au Katanga, 1910-1997*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2001.

and reputational risks emanating from the communities next to the mines and those dislocated by industrial mining. Therefore companies target selected groups in the flexible space of 'their mining communities'. Criminologists have termed this, more general, trend in policing 'actuarial risk management[95]'. It draws on prevention and surveillance, acts on risk profiles, and seeks to activate private citizens for security purposes.

Such an understanding of security governance as advanced risk management has encouraged the integration of organisational units within companies that are responsible for security, social development and public relations. As 'their communities' are sometimes companies' greatest risk, both to physical security and to reputation, engaging with communities complements traditional security management through deterrence and control[96]. Another manager describes how, through a dialogue with communities and through education, his company tries to make people accept the company as a "*patrimoine de leur environnement*[97]". The idea is to make the poor village communities the company's partners, socially sanctioning theft from the mine and denouncing intruders.

For achieving these aims, development projects are strategically placed in communities in the immediate environment of mining operations. The result is a narrow geographical scope of company governance. Another company security manager explains why: "We are not interested in building roads way outside our theatre of operation which have no direct advantage to the mining operation[98]". Risk management also entails the creation of regular consultation channels with communities. In Katanga, the large companies have introduced liaison officers into selected settlements, and it is hoped that they will resolve potential conflicts, through communication or donations but also provide companies with intelligence so that they are better prepared for potential trouble[99].

Such 'developmental' interventions in the vicinity of mining operations have not only been privatised, but have also been transnationalised. In the community belt, a node of international NGOs, donor agencies, PMSCs and

95. P. O'Malley, "Risk and Responsibility", *in* O. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (eds.), *Foucault and Political Reason*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 189–208.
96. Interviews with development and security managers of a mining company, November 2008, Kolwezi.
97. Interview with company social development manager, November 2008, Lubumbashi.
98. Interview with ex-group security manager, October 2007, Ndola, Zambia; interview with general manager and social manager, November 2008, Lubumbashi.
99. Interviews with several staff of Pact Congo (see <pactworld.org>) in November 2007 and 2008, Lubumbashi; interviews with security and community managers of TFM/Freeport, KOL/DCP, and Anvil Mining, 2007 and 2008, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi.

consultancy outfits work for companies to manage local order and development. Freeport, Anvil Mining and others increasingly contract NGOs, such as Pact or International Alert, and the growing number of consultancies that specialise in mining, community relations and/or security. To mitigate conflict, Freeport and Anvil Mining have contracted Pact Congo, a local branch of the US-based NGO Pact, to work with artisanal miners. Amongst others, it has created small business projects with them to create alternative income opportunities. Companies even create local NGOs and community based organisations themselves. In addition, donor organisations such as the US and British development departments (USAID and DfID), have made the extractive industries in Katanga a focus of their work in the DRC. USAID initially financed Pact to enter into partnership with the large mining companies to support them in managing social relations. At the height of the price boom on the copper and cobalt markets in 2008, the consultancy branch of Pact had grown at such a pace that the organisation was largely paid for by companies [100].

The above illustrates that the large mining companies in Southern Katanga are very much involved in governing in the space adjacent to their operations – imagined by them in spatial terms as a 'community belt'. This belt is, at the same time, increasingly integrated into transnational political fields. With regards to the outcomes and effects of such community engagement, further research is needed on the effects on local politics and the structural limitations of the kind of participatory community governance described above. The new ways of engaging with communities put local political hierarchies in question and may thus negatively affect corporate security. It has been shown that democratic principles conflict with companies interest in stability [101]. Companies have also often proved to be conservative forces that eventually side with the powerful and those recognised as sovereign [102]. A security manager expressed it this way: "We are stuck with those who are in power. There is no time lamenting about it. You want that copper? Deal with it! [103]". Some mining companies in Katanga have co-opted local chiefs through putting them on the payroll of the company, for instance. These examples point to the historical continuity of indirect rule.

100. Conversations with both country representatives of USAID and DfID, October and November 2008, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.
101. See for example M. A. Welker, "Corporate Security Begins in the Community: Mining, the Corporate Social Responsibility Industry, and Environmental Advocacy in Indonesia", *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 24, n° 1, 2009, p. 142–179.
102. W. Reno, "Order and Commerce in Turbulent Areas: 19th Century Lessons, 21st Century Practice", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 25, n° 4, 2004, p. 607–625.
103. Interview with group security manager, October 2007, Ndola, Zambia.

I have suggested in this article a scaling down of the focus of analysis from the level of the state to particular socio-economic areas in order to comparatively investigate reconfigurations of political topographies in Africa. I have argued that macro-level changes in governance and political topographies in the international and transnational realm articulate differently in particular socio-economic contexts. This article has investigated the political topographies in a particular site – the local business spaces of multinational mining companies in Southern Katanga – representing a particularly transnationalised bubble of governance. I have argued that the increasing role of corporate entities in local security governance can be understood as a new form of a policy of indirect discharge by companies' host and home states which draw on companies to perform state functions, such as enforcing mining rights and managing social order. What makes the 'new' topographies of governing security distinctive is not the pluralisation of actors as such [104], but the new, much more indirect technologies of governance and the spatial order they produce. In the past, the Belgian king, and later on the Belgian government, directly delegated authority to companies in order to build colonial rule. Today the DRC government, as well as the companies' home states and the international community indirectly discharge local security governance to the mining companies. There are however differences in how and where security is governed now and in the past. Previously companies sought to comprehensively transform identities and bodies through coercive and disciplinary power based on a territorial strategy of compound rule. In the contemporary model, companies protect private fortresses of production, but also reach out beyond the fortresses of the mine into the 'community belt' around it. As opposed to the territorial fix and disciplinary regime of governing labour described for the 1890s to 1920s, the topography of this new risk management regime is narrower with regard to territorial control but broader and more flexible in its geographical scope.

The case study has shown that processes of re-spatialisation do take place, but that they are not necessarily at the expense of the state. In the case of industrial extraction, the transnational economic networks are closely entangled with the state, both in the countries in which they operate and with regard to their home states. Furthermore, the (semi-)private governance of business spaces is very limited and selective in its geographical, social and functional scope. What we see is, in John Agnew's terms, a regime of territoriality in which the territorial state, local polities and transnational

104. W. Reno, "Order…", art. cit.; P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003, chapter 2.

economic and social networks are intertwined[105]. While different spatial orders have always coexisted, shifts in how they are related are taking place. What emerges from the analysis of company governance in Katanga is that there is a change in the hierarchical relationship between different scales compared to the period after the Second World War and the post-independence period: governance by governments was less a norm states at least referred to as aspired goal before and during early colonialism, as well as it is less so today. The article has hopefully demonstrated that looking into the production, use and interaction between different territorialities – state-based, company-controlled, or local polities' bounded spaces – and transnational economic networks, functional fields, or practice communities, provides an innovative lens for future research through which new local and global topographies of power and de facto sovereignty can be explored ■

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Résumé

Nouvelles topographies politiques. Entreprises minières et décharges indirectes au Sud du Katanga (RDC)

Cet article entend analyser les reconfigurations actuelles du système politique en Afrique en étudiant la manière dont les multinationales gèrent la sécurité dans les régions minières de cuivre et de cobalt au Sud du Katanga (République démocratique du Congo – RDC). Ce texte cherche à démontrer que l'extension du rôle des entreprises dans la gestion du système politique au Sud du Katanga peut être interprétée comme une nouvelle forme de décharge indirecte effectuée par le pays d'accueil et par le pays d'origine de l'entreprise multinationale, pour externaliser, en grande partie, la gouvernance locale. Cela suggère des topographies politiques qui diffèrent de celles de la gestion de la sécurité par les entreprises au XIXe et XXe siècles.

105. J. Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty*, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009.